DONCER v. DICKERSON, 81 S.W.3d 349, Tex. App.
Procedural Posture
Appellant
stepmother filed a suit affecting the parent-child relationship against
appellee mother for possessory conservatorship of a six-year-old boy following
the death of the child's father. The 366th District Court of Collin
County, Texas, dismissed the suit for lack
of standing. The stepmother appealed.
Outcome: The judgment of the district
court was reversed and remanded.
The court concluded that the step-mother
had standing to sue, having established her home was the child's
principal residence for a period of at least 6 months before she filed suit.
Overview
The
child's mother and father were divorced. They had a joint conservatorship
agreement. Each of them had approximately equal custody of the
child. Doncer,( the stepmother), lived with the child's father for over
three years at the time of his death. Over the 2 year visitation cycle,
the Doncer had the child with them >50% of the time in even numbered years
and 48% in odd-numbered years. The stepmother's relationship with the
child was similar to a parent-child relationship, and the child had a
half-sister. The stepmother volunteered for school activities and was
active in the child's sporting events. After the death of the father,
Dickerson (the mother) stopped all contact between the child and the
stepmother. The trial court found that Doncer lacked standing and
dismissed the suit.
Standard of Review: Standing presents a
question of law. The standard of review of an order for lack of standing is the
same as same as that for an order of dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals reviews the issue de novo.
The appellate court found that, when a child's parent died,
and the child's stepparent helped to raise him, Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 102.003(a)(11) was designed
as a "stepparent" statute, affording standing to the stepparent to
bring an action affecting the parent-child relationship.
The
“have resided” qualification for SAPCR standing under § 102.003(a)(9) is not
limited to “principle residence,” but rather any residence established within
the other guidelines of the statute. DONCER v. DICKERSON, 81 S.W.3d 349,
Tex. App.—El Paso 2002.
§ 102.003 General Standing to File Suit: (11)
a person with whom the child and the child’s guardian, managing conservator, or
parent have resided for at least six
months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the
petition if the child’s guardian, managing conservator, or parent is deceased
at the time of the filing of the petition.
102.003(b)
In computing the time necessary for standing, the court may not require
that the time be continuous and uninterrupted but shall consider the
child's principal residence during
the relevant time preceding the date of commencement of the suit.
Doncer
argued that the phrase "principal residence" is a general
provision meant to be used by a parent or other care giver against a person
with whom a child temporarily or occasionally resided, not as between parents
or joint managing conservators with whom a child shares his time.
The
court held that surviving step-parent’s home where child resided for at least
six months during the proscribed period in a fixed
place of abode, occupied consistently over a substantial period of time, and
which is permanent rather than temporary qualifies as a place where child “has
resided” for purposes of creating standing for surviving step-parent to pursue
SAPCR.