189 S.W.3d 777
Supreme Court of Texas.
In re Karen MAYS–HOOPER.
No. 04–1040.
April 7, 2006.
Background: Paternal grandmother brought suit seeking visitation with child. The 322nd Judicial District Court, Tarrant County, Frank Sullivan, J., issued order awarding grandmother visitation. Mother sought mandamus relief, challenging the order. A panel of the Ft. Worth Court of Appeals denied relief and the entire Court of Appeals voted to deny mother's motion for rehearing en banc. Mother sought mandamus relief in the Supreme Court.
Holding: The Supreme Court held that paternal grandmother was not entitled to visitation with child.
Mandamus relief conditionally granted.
Prior History:
In re Mays-Hooper, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9138 (Tex. App. Fort Worth, Oct. 15, 2004)
trial court, grandparents, mother-in-law, trial court's order, no evidence, weekend, mandamus relief, private realm, court-ordered, deference, plurality, inject, vacate, unfit, died
Procedural Posture
Overview
Outcome
In re Mays-Hooper, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 9138 (Tex. App. Fort Worth, Oct. 15, 2004)
Core Terms
trial court, grandparents, mother-in-law, trial court's order, no evidence, weekend, mandamus relief, private realm, court-ordered, deference, plurality, inject, vacate, unfit, died
Case Summary
Procedural Posture
Relator mother sought review of a decision from the Second Court of Appeals (Texas), which denied mandamus relief from the trial court's order granting grandparent visitation pursuant toTex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.432.
Overview
After the father's death, conflicts arose between the mother and the paternal grandmother. The trial court rejected the mother's due process arguments and ordered grandparent visitation. The court held that § 153.432 was unconstitutional as applied because there was no evidence that the mother was unfit, no evidence that the child's health or emotional well-being would suffer if the trial court deferred to her decisions, and no evidence that she intended to exclude the grandmother's access completely. The court stated that, so long as a parent adequately cared for his or her children, there normally would be no reason for the state to inject itself into the private realm of the family. Accordingly, the trial court's visitation order was a clear abuse of discretion.
Outcome
West Headnotes (2)Collapse West Headnotes
Paternal grandmother was not entitled to visitation with child, as there was no evidence mother was unfit, no evidence child's health or emotional well-being would suffer if trial court deferred to mother's decisions, and no evidence mother intended to exclude grandmother's access to child completely. V.T.C.A., Family Code § 153.432.
So long as a parent adequately cares for his children, i.e., is fit, there will normally be no reason for the state to inject itself into the private realm of the family.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
In Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), the Supreme Court of the United States held unconstitutional a Washington trial court's order granting a boy's grandparents visitation rights over the objection of his mother. Because the trial court's order here is indistinguishable, it must meet the same fate.
The subject of these proceedings is a son born to Karen Mays–Hooper and her husband Kelly Hooper in 1997. The couple divorced in 2000, and Kelly died in 2003. After Kelly's death, conflicts arose between Karen and her mother-in-law, Linda Thornton, resulting in a suit by the latter for court-ordered access to the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.432. The trial court rejected Karen's claims that the statute was unconstitutional and awarded her mother-in-law “possession” of the child for one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer, four days during Christmas vacation, and alternating Thanksgiving weekends, as well as access through weekly telephone calls. A panel of the Second Court of Appeals voted 2–1 to deny relief, and the entire court voted 4–3 to deny the motion for rehearing en banc. We reach the opposite conclusion.
The facts in Troxel are in all relevant respects the same as those here. In Troxel, the father of two daughters died, and his parents sought court-ordered visitation over the mother's objection. The trial court ordered visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on each grandparent's birthday.
The Supreme Court found the trial court's order unconstitutional, although none of the six opinions garnered a majority. A plurality of four justices found the visitation statute in Troxel unconstitutional *778 as applied, pointing to three factors: (1) the child's mother was not unfit, (2) her decisions about grandparent access were given no deference, and (3) she was willing to allow some visitation.Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–71, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The plurality declined to say when a visitation statute would violate the Due Process Clause facially, as “the constitutional protections in this area are best ‘elaborated with care.’ ” Id. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting id. at 101, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). Justice Souter concurred in the judgment, but would have held the statute unconstitutional on its face. Id. at 76–77, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, noting only that neither party challenged the Court's substantive-due-process jurisprudence, and that he would have applied a strict-scrutiny standard of review.Id. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy each dissented in different opinions for different reasons. Id. at 80–102, 120 S.Ct. 2054.
1We need not sort out all the opinions in Troxel; because the facts here are virtually the same, the judgment must be the same too. In this case (as in Troxel ) there was no evidence that the child's mother was unfit, no evidence that the boy's health or emotional well-being would suffer if the court deferred to her decisions, and no evidence that she intended to exclude Thornton's access completely.
Thornton attempts to distinguish Troxel in two respects. First, she points out that the Texas statute applies only to grandparents related to a parent who has lost access (due to termination of rights, incompetency, incarceration, or death), and thus is not as broad as the one in Troxel that allowed “[a]ny person” at “any time” to seek visitation. Id. at 60, 120 S.Ct. 2054. But as the statute in Troxelwas unconstitutional as applied to the specific context of grandparents related to a deceased father, it is hard to see why a statute limited to that context would fare any better.
2Thornton also argues that the trial court “gave special weight to Karen's determinations for the child,” but points to nothing other than the trial court's careful attention to her testimony. Karen articulated several reasons for not wanting to turn her son over to her mother-in-law (differences about church attendance, what to say about Kelly's death, and alleged inattention by her mother-in-law), which the trial court apparently rejected without stating any reason. “[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family....” Id. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The trial court did not indicate any reason why that rule should not be followed here.
As the statute at issue here has since been amended,1 we decline the parties' invitation to analyze the repealed statute more extensively. As the parties agree mandamus relief is appropriate if the trial court's temporary orders were a clear abuse of discretion, we grant it. See Little v. Daggett, 858 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex.1993).
Without hearing oral argument, TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(C), we conditionally grant mandamus relief and direct the trial court to vacate its order of September 21, 2004 granting grandparent possession. We are confident that the trial court will promptly comply, and our writ will issue only if it does not.
Justice WILLETT did not participate in the decision.